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ABSTRACT 
The available evidence indicates that patent quality, 
particularly in the area of software, needs improvement. This 
Article argues that even an agency as institutionally constrained 
as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) could 
implement a portfolio of pragmatic, cost-effective quality 
improvement strategies. The argument in favor of these 
strategies draws upon not only legal theory and doctrine but also 
new data from a PTO software examination unit with relatively 
strict practices. Strategies that resolve around Section 112 of the 
patent statute could usefully be deployed at the initial 
examination stage. Other strategies could be deployed within the 
new post-issuance procedures available to the agency under the 
America Invents Act. Notably, although the strategies the Article 
discusses have the virtue of being neutral as to technology, they 
are likely to have a very significant practical impact in the area 
of software. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When critics bemoan “bad” or “poor-quality” patents that 
stifle innovation rather than promote it, they often mean 
software patents.1 The available evidence suggests that 
complaints about quality have some merit, at least for software 
patents that have issued since the mid- to late-1990s.2 Beginning 
in that time period, a number of important decisions emerging 
from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the court with 
                                                     
 1. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 18 (2008) (focusing on problems of 
notice in software patents); Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and 
Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2013) (“Effective notice is a far greater 
challenge when the resources in question are intangible.”); see also Julie E. Cohen & 
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 
1, 12–13, 39, 56 (2001) (discussing excessive breadth in software patents). 
 2. See infra Part II.A. 
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intermediate appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases)3 relaxed 
criteria for examining software applications with respect to such 
key statutory requirements as patent-eligible subject matter,4 
nonobviousness,5 and appropriate notice and scope under 
Section 112 of the patent statute.6 
Low-quality software patents issued by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) generate the usual negative 
static effects, in the form of either unnecessary licensing fees or 
deadweight loss.7 They also generate deleterious dynamic effects, 
as firms in the information and communications technology 
industries must accumulate large defensive arsenals in order to 
avoid being sued.8 Low-quality software patents also appear to be 
the primary tool used by patent assertion entities (PAEs) in the 
significant number of cases they bring against firms small and 
large.9 
Faced with this diagnosis, scholars have formulated a 
plethora of prescriptions.10 Unlike many scholars, I focus here 
on the administrative process. My aim is deliberately 
pragmatic. I take as a given almost all of the PTO’s current 
institutional constraints. Additionally, I offer solutions that 
are agnostic as to technology. Remaining agnostic about 
technology not only avoids very difficult line-drawing 
regarding what constitutes a software patent but also takes 
                                                     
 3. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to 
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2003). 
 4. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 5. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343–45 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Zurko, 111 
F.3d 887, 889–90 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 6. See, e.g., Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Electric Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1548–49 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (“[W]riting code for . . . software is within the skill of the art . . . once its functions 
have been disclosed. . . . [F]low charts or source code listings are not a requirement for 
adequately disclosing the functions of software.”). 
  By using the term “appropriate notice” in the text, I emphasize that the goal 
cannot, and should not, be perfect notice. Not only is perfect notice an impossibility when 
the rights at issue involve intangibles, but any attempt to achieve perfect notice would 
likely undermine appropriate scope. 
 7. See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, in 8 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 111, 112, 125–26 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2008). 
 8. See infra note 27. 
 9. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 5 
(June 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report. 
pdf. In mentioning PAEs, I do not mean to suggest that PAE assertions of patents should 
necessarily be treated differently from assertions by practicing entities. Rather, I single 
out PAEs simply because the primary patents they are asserting appear to be software 
patents of low quality. See infra Part II.A. This Article also does not tackle complex 
questions of patent holdup or abusive patent litigation, whether by PAEs, the broader 
category of nonpracticing entities (which includes universities), or by practicing entities. 
 10. See infra Part III (detailing solutions promulgated by others). 
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into account the PTO’s institutional need to avoid 
“discrimination” against any particular type of technology.11 
The institutional context in which the PTO operates is 
challenging. Even with the fortification of agency power that 
emerges from the new post-issuance proceedings set up by the 
America Invents Act (AIA), the PTO lacks rulemaking authority 
over the content of patent validity requirements.12 In addition to 
limiting the PTO’s policymaking influence, this dearth of 
rulemaking power makes the PTO vulnerable to challenges that 
it has acted beyond its authority when it attempts to impose 
significant procedural constraints or work burdens on 
applicants.13 Meanwhile, the presence of a vigorous union 
constrains the agency’s ability to place additional work burdens 
on examiners conducting initial examination.14 
                                                     
 11. For this reason, although I agree that the various new administrative 
procedures created in the America Invents Act of 2011 could be improved by further 
expanding administrative opportunities to challenge patent validity, I have questions 
about current proposals that would limit expanded opportunities to software-enabled 
inventions only. See Letter to Congress Objecting to Covered Business Method Patent 
Legislative Proposals (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/170311368/ 
Letter-100-Innovative-Businesses-and-Organizations-Send-Letter-to-Congress-Objecting-
to-Covered-Business-Method-Patent-Legislative-Proposals (discussing proposals). 
 12. Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s 
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2052–53 (2009); see also 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 3. The other obvious institutional actor, 
Congress, is a favorite of judges who believe they should not be making policy 
determinations. The delegation doctrine emerged in significant part, however, because 
congressional attention and expertise are limited, and legislation that Congress 
prescribes in the face of rapidly changing technological circumstances can quickly become 
obsolete. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: 
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 368 (2010). 
Although administrative agencies are the typical recipient of delegated power, the 
judiciary can also be a delegate. See id at 365. 
 13. Most notably, the PTO’s decision to limit the number of “repeat” patent 
applications that can be filed was met with a lawsuit challenging the PTO’s authority to 
issue the rules. Rather than continue to fight the challenge, the PTO withdrew the rules. 
See Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The PTO may in the future be 
emboldened by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 
1863 (2013). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an agency’s interpretation of 
ambiguous language governing its statutory authority is entitled to Chevron deference. 
Id. at 1874–75. But this Article does not assume significant changes as a consequence of 
Arlington. Even if the Federal Circuit were to deem particular rules seen as onerous by 
patent applicants to be within the PTO’s authority, it would likely be influenced by 
applicant arguments that the rules failed under the “arbitrary and capricious” hard look 
standard. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
41 (1983). And the Supreme Court might have little interest in taking a case that 
required delving into the details of PTO’s examination process. 
 14.  I discuss issues regarding misaligned incentives on the part of examiners, 
applicants, and the PTO in detail in a 2009 article. Rai, supra note 12, at 2056, 2062–63 
(discussing a skewed incentives structure and how “the complexities of collective 
bargaining with a union that represents over 6000 examiners pose a formidable 
challenge”). One of then-Director David Kappos’s first actions upon assuming office late in 
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Even taking all of these constraints as a given, however, the 
PTO can and should play a role in improving quality, including 
software patent quality. As this Article discusses, quality can be 
improved to some extent at the initial examination stage.15 And 
the possibilities for improvement through the PTO’s new post-
issuance procedures are particularly promising. 
The PTO has already done some work at the initial 
examination stage. Through examination guidelines issued in 
February 2011, and through two requests for comments issued in 
January 2013, the PTO has highlighted Section 112 validity 
requirements in the area of software.16 In June 2013, President 
Obama issued a short Executive Order underscoring the 
importance of this work.17 With the exception of the February 
2011 guidelines, however, the details of how quality 
improvement should be accomplished administratively remain 
sparse. In this Article, I flesh out what the PTO should do, and 
why these actions might actually work. 
With respect to initial examination, there is reason to 
believe that certain Section 112 requirements could be applied 
more strictly even by examiners working under severe time 
constraints. In fact, the available evidence suggests that the 
February 2011 guidelines on Section 112 have already had some 
                                                     
2009 was to implement a modest increase in incentives for examiners to act quickly on 
patent applications. Ed O’Keefe, New Boss Moves Quickly to Change Sluggish Patent 
Office, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2009, at A17. Given union bargaining power, the policy space 
for dramatic changes in incentive structure may be limited, however. Additionally, despite 
the AIA’s grant of some fee-setting authority to the PTO, the current cost structure 
remains one in which PTO recovers most of its application processing costs through back-
end issuance and maintenance fees. See USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee031913.htm (last revised Oct. 
4, 2013). Some scholars have argued that this cost structure gives the agency an incentive 
to grant applications, at least when it is under financial pressure. See Michael D. Frakes 
& Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect Decision Making?: An Empirical 
Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 92, 101–03 (2013) 
(arguing, based on historical data, that the PTO has historically granted a higher 
percentage of patent applications during times when it has been under financial 
pressure). 
 15. See infra Part IV (discussing three “key” Section 112 requirements used to 
control breadth and vagueness—definiteness, scope limitations associated with means or 
step plus function claiming, and written description). 
 16. Request for Comments on Preparation of Patent Applications, 78 Fed. Reg. 
2960, 2960–61 (Jan. 15, 2013); Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events 
for Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 
292, 292–93 (Jan. 3, 2013); Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining 
Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent 
Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7163–70 (Feb. 9, 2011). 
 17. Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, WHITE HOUSE 
(June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-
house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues. 
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impact.18 Similarly, data I have gathered on an Art Unit set up to 
examine rigorously a particular category of software applications 
(bioinformatics) reveal that the Section 112 definiteness 
requirement was actually deployed in the vast majority of 
cases.19 This bioinformatics Art Unit also provides useful 
specific illustrations of how written description, a requirement 
often criticized by patent scholars (myself included) as being 
overly formalistic,20 might productively be deployed.21 As this 
Article discusses, proper use of written description could do 
substantial work in addressing concerns about so-called 
functional claiming, even if the PTO does not adopt proposals 
to further expand the application of Section 112(f) restrictions 
to such claiming.22 
Post-issuance, pursuant to the new authorities that 
Congress has given the PTO under the AIA,23 the agency may 
be poised to assert significant control over quality. The 
congressional directive that the post-grant proceedings be 
completed within one year should make it easier for district 
courts to justify staying parallel litigation pending PTO 
review.24 Recent Federal Circuit cases indicating that post-
issuance administrative proceedings can cancel patent claims 
even after a district court has found those claims “not invalid” 
should further enhance the attractiveness of stays.25 
At the post-issuance stage, mechanisms other than 
Section 112—most notably, a robust nonobviousness analysis—
could be used. The congressional instruction that PTO post-
issuance proceedings be conducted using the sorts of formal 
procedures that typically yield Chevron deference may further 
enhance PTO authority, giving the PTO a significant role in 
                                                     
 18. David Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Keynote Address at the 
Center for American Progress: An Examination of Software Patents (Nov. 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2012/kappos_CAP.jsp. 
 19. Arti Rai, Research Conducted on Applications from 2003, Art Unit 1631 (2013) 
(on file with author). 
 20. Rai, supra note 3, at 1073–74; Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 835–36 (1999); 
see also Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written 
Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 55, 85 (2000); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written 
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Innovations, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 
650–51 (1998). 
 21. Rai, supra note 19. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2012) (granting the Director of the PTO authority to 
implement new regulations in accordance with the Act). 
 24. Id. § 316(a)(11). 
 25. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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promoting quality not only through individual validity 
determinations but also through decisions on law and policy. 
Part II of the Article briefly summarizes the literature on 
the economic difficulties created by poor-quality software patents 
and also addresses why the PTO needs to be part of the solution. 
Part III outlines why, more so than other patent validity 
requirements, certain Section 112 issues are a useful area of PTO 
focus in the context of initial examination. Part IV discusses 
these Section 112 requirements in detail, outlines what the PTO 
has done to date, and discusses steps it should take going 
forward. Part V discusses how the post-grant proceedings 
available to the PTO under the AIA could place the PTO at the 
center not only of patent validity questions in individual cases 
but also patent law and policy more generally. 
II. THE SOFTWARE PATENT CHALLENGE 
This Part briefly summarizes the extant economic literature 
and also makes the case for why the PTO needs to be part of the 
solution not only post-grant but also at the initial examination 
stage. 
A. The Economics of the Issue 
The number of software patents that issue each year is 
debatable, in significant part because the definition of “software 
patent” is hotly contested.26 What is clear is that firms, both large 
and small, that produce products involving software must 
accumulate significant patent portfolios in order to avoid being 
sued.27 The cost associated with this tactic of “mutual assured 
destruction” is nontrivial. In the smartphone arena alone, the 
cost of acquiring defensive patent portfolios has run into the tens 
                                                     
 26. For an extended discussion of the debate over the definition, see Arti K. Rai, 
John R. Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Software Ownership and Litigation: A 
First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1526–33 (2009). In a group of university patents, 
the overlap between the patents identified as software by Rai, Allison, and Sampat (RAS), 
using a definition originally developed by John Allison, had only about a 50% overlap with 
patents identified as software through a prominent keyword-based algorithm used by 
James Bessen and Bob Hunt. Id. at 1531 n.60, 1532. However, the total number of 
software patents identified by the two approaches was similar. Id. at 1531 n.60. 
Approaches that rely on PTO or IPC technology classes, such as those employed by 
Graham and Mowery, yield even less overlap with the RAS approach. Id. at 1530 n.54 
(noting that the approach employed by Graham and Mowery did not classify as software 
86% of the patents classified as software by RAS). 
 27. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 306, 321–22 
(2010) (discussing defensive patenting strategy); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk 
Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26–27, 43–50 (2005) (same). 
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of billions.28 Meanwhile, the extent to which the underlying 
patents in these portfolios were responsible for significant 
smartphone innovation is unclear. In any event, in this arena, 
mutual assured destruction has been less than fully successful—
firms with massive portfolios have recently spent many millions 
of dollars suing each other over a variety of software-enabled 
smartphone features.29 
To be sure, patents that large corporate players choose to 
assert in smartphone litigation may be of relatively high 
quality.30 Concerns about quality in litigated patents are likely to 
be more acute with respect to patents asserted by those entities 
that do not manufacture products. I turn next to these patents. 
As has now been widely documented, many patent-holding 
entities that do not produce products, and thus are not, even in 
theory, subject to the logic of mutual assured destruction, bring a 
substantial percentage of patent cases.31 For purposes of this 
Article, I do not need to engage the extensive debate over how 
NPEs (a term that includes universities but excludes product 
manufacturers) or patent-assertion entities (PAEs) (a term that 
does not include universities or product manufacturers) should 
be viewed.32 No matter one’s views on NPEs and PAEs, 
                                                     
 28. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 11. 
 29. Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 
WIS. L. REV. 905, 931–34. 
 30. Stuart Graham and Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Of Smart Phone Wars and 
Software Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 67, 73 (2013) (finding that of twenty-one 
software patents in smart phone litigation that had been the subject of a judicial or 
administrative decision, only four had been found invalid or likely invalid). Of course 
twenty-one is a very small sample size. 
 31. In 2011, NPEs brought almost 40% of cases, up from 22% in 2007. Sara Jeruss, 
Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent 
Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361, 381 (2012). 
Since 2011, the nominal percentage has risen even further (to over 60%), but the recent 
increases appear to be an artifact of the AIA’s misjoinder provisions, which make it more 
difficult for NPEs to sue large numbers of defendants in a single case. Dennis Crouch & 
Jason Rantanen, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:31 
AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html. 
 32. Commentators have expressed opinions on the question of whether NPEs and 
PAEs simply engage in rent-seeking based on the threat of costly litigation or could, at 
least potentially, facilitate markets for technology. See, e.g., James E. Bessen & Michael 
J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
Others have attempted to quantify the economic impact of NPEs and PAEs. In one 
prominent analysis, James Bessen and Michael Meurer rely on stock market event 
studies tied to lawsuit filings to estimate that NPEs have imposed on publicly traded 
technology firms costs on the order of perhaps $500 billion over the last 20 years. James 
Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 
REGULATION, Winter 2011–2012, at 26, 29–31. Bessen, Ford, and Meurer further argue 
that these costs have been particularly high in recent years, on the order of over $80 
billion per year. Id. at 26. In another paper, Bessen and Meurer rely on survey data and a 
proprietary database of NPE litigation compiled by RPX, to estimate that in 2011 the 
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presumably significant amounts of litigation fueled by low-
quality patents is problematic. 
The available evidence suggests that NPE litigation, and 
litigation more generally, is indeed fueled by low-quality software 
patents. Using a definition of software he has developed with Bob 
Hunt,33 James Bessen estimates software patents represent 62% 
of NPE patent assertions.34 Similarly, according to research done 
by John Allison, Mark Lemley, and Joshua Walker (and using a 
different definition of software developed by John Allison), 
software patents represent the majority of frequently litigated 
patents.35 The Allison/Lemley/Walker (ALW) research also 
indicates that software patent litigation typically involves 
patents of dubious quality. In a sample of litigated cases studied 
by ALW (and using Allison’s definition of software patent), 
software patentees won only 12.9% of the cases that were 
litigated to judgment. By contrast, nonsoftware patent owners 
won 51.1% of the cases.36 
Thus, at least for patents that have already issued, and in 
all likelihood for patent examination going forward, quality is a 
central challenge. The next Subpart makes the argument for why 
the PTO should play a role in addressing quality issues and for 
why this involvement is likely to be useful not only at the post-
issuance stage but also during initial examination. 
                                                     
direct costs of NPE patent assertions—both assertions that led to litigation and assertions 
that were settled prior to the filing of a lawsuit—ran as high as $29 billion. Bessen & 
Meurer, supra. 
  David Schwartz and Jay Kesan have taken issue with the Bessen and Meurer 
numbers, arguing that, with respect to the $29 billion calculation, the extrapolation that 
Bessen and Meurer do from survey data is unreliable. David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, 
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014). Schwartz and Kesan also argue that the calculation relies on an 
overly broad definition of what sorts of firms should be counted as NPEs and 
insufficiently justifies a conclusion that all of the $29 billion represents a “cost” (as 
contrasted with compensation for a legitimate patent). Id. 
 33. Robert Hunt & James Bessen, The Software Patent Experiment, BUS. REV., 
Third Quarter 2004, at 22, 24. 
 34. Bessen, Ford & Meurer, supra note 32, at 29. 
 35. According to Allison, Lemley, and Walker, software patents represent 74% of 
the patents that have been litigated more than eight times since 2000. John R. Allison, 
Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent 
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 695–96 (2011). 
 36. Id. at 696–97. These statistics include default judgments for the plaintiff. See 
also Shawn P. Miller, What’s the Connection Between Repeat Litigation and Patent 
Quality? A (Partial) Defense of the Most Litigated Patents, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 313, 
316 (2013) (disagreeing with some of ALW’s conclusions regarding repeat litigation but 
“confirm[ing] their finding that software and NPE-owned patents lose more decisions 
regardless of the number of lawsuits in which they are asserted”). 
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B. Why the PTO Needs to Be Part of the Solution 
The argument for a relatively minimal PTO role rests on 
data indicating that, even in software, most patents are the 
subject of neither licensing disputes nor litigation.37 Moreover, to 
the extent that firms in software-intensive industries do not 
bother to conduct freedom-to-operate searches,38 the deterrent 
effect on innovation that such patents impose prior to licensing or 
litigation is unclear. Thus devoting significant resources to 
administrative examination of software patents would not be 
cost-effective. 
At least with respect to post-issuance administrative review, 
the argument has largely been settled. Commentators have 
persuasively argued that the inability of firms to internalize fully 
the benefits of a successful patent invalidation, as well as their 
ability to pass on to consumers the cost of licensing bad patents, 
will result in suboptimal numbers of challenges to patent validity 
through expensive litigation in Article III courts.39 Presumably 
the requirement that a party generally pays its own attorneys’ 
costs even when it wins adds to the burden of litigating 
invalidity.40 The importance of post-grant issuance proceedings 
where patents can be challenged under a preponderance of the 
evidence standard is further highlighted by the Supreme Court’s 
2011 decision in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, which 
holds that those who challenge issued patents in court will 
continue to bear the burden of proving invalidity by “clear and 
convincing evidence.”41 
The more challenging question involves what level of 
resources should be deployed to improve quality at the initial 
                                                     
 37. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 153 (indicating that only 4.6% of software 
patents are likely to be involved in a patent suit). 
 38. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22 
(“[B]oth researchers and companies in component industries simply ignore 
patents. . . . [Rather than conducting a search for prior patents], they wait and see if any 
patent owner claims that the new product infringes their patent.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend 
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative 
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 955–60 (2004) (concluding through 
mathematical analysis that it is economically favorable for an alleged infringer to pay a 
license fee rather than have the patent invalidated through litigation). 
 40. The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of when the losing party in a patent case 
should be ordered to pay the attorneys’ fees of the winning party is the subject of two 
cases on which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon 
Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 12-1184, 2013 WL 1283843 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013); Highmark Inc. 
v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., No. 12-1163, 2013 WL 1217353 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013). 
Congress is also considering legislation on this issue. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 
113th Cong. § 3(b)(1)(a)–(b) (2013). 
 41. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242, 2252 (2011). 
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examination stage, at least for the “ordinary” applicant who does 
not deem her application sufficiently pressing to pay for fast-
track agency procedures.42 A first-best answer to this interesting 
question awaits further study. For purposes of this Article, 
however, I am taking as a given the limited amount of time that 
examiners have. I am also taking as a given the likelihood that 
applicants will object to, and potentially even challenge through 
litigation, PTO rulemaking that imposes significant burdens. If 
initial examination can be improved with tools readily deployable 
within these constraints, these tools represent a Pareto 
improvement and are worth deploying. Thus, in the next Part, 
which focuses on initial examination, I assess potential quality-
enhancement tools through the lens of whether they are 
inexpensive to deploy. 
III. POTENTIAL QUALITY-ENHANCEMENT SOLUTIONS: INITIAL 
EXAMINATION 
Many commentators view the key problems with software 
patent quality (as contrasted with remedies and potential 
defenses such as independent invention or prior use, which I do 
not address here) as including: overly broad eligibility for 
patenting; obviousness; the grant of patents with scope that 
exceeds their level of disclosure; and the grant of patents with 
unclear claim language that fails to provide adequate notice. 
A. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter 
Some commentators have argued that software (or at least 
“pure software”) should not represent subject matter eligible for 
patenting under Section 101 of the patent statute.43 On this view, 
because pure software is simply disembodied information 
processing, its bounds are difficult to articulate using tools of 
patent claiming that borrow from tangible property.44 
Categorically excluding pure software from the realm of 
patentability presumably requires a definition of software. As 
noted earlier, analysts have struggled over what sorts of patent 
                                                     
 42. Through the PTO’s Track One prioritized examination, applicants receive a 
final determination in approximately twelve months. USPTO’s Prioritized Patent 
Examination Program, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/ 
init_events/Track_One.jsp (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 43. A classic reference is Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against 
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 
EMORY L.J. 1025, 1134–35 (1990). See also Against Software Patents: The League for 
Programming Freedom, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 297, 311 (1992) (arguing that 
software should be excluded from patents). 
 44. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 10. 
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claims focus sufficiently on data processing such that they should 
be deemed to represent software patent claims.45 The overall 
agreement between prominent analysts such as John Allison; 
Bessen and Hunt; and Graham and Mowery has been, at best, 
only about 50%.46 Thus it is perhaps not surprising that, for over 
forty years, in cases involving both process and product claims, 
the PTO and the courts have struggled with categorical rules for 
defining software.47 
The so-called machine-or-transformation test for software 
process claims, suggested by the Supreme Court in the 1981 case 
Diamond v. Diehr,48 and advocated by the PTO before the 
Supreme Court in the 2010 case of Bilski v. Kappos,49 is the most 
prominent example of a categorical rule.50 Under this test, the 
patent claim in question may contain an algorithm, but the 
algorithm must be limited to a particular machine or involved in 
a transformation of matter in order to be patent-eligible.51 
In Bilski, the Supreme Court rejected the categorical 
approach in favor of a more flexible, transtechnological 
“abstraction” standard for determining what sorts of invention 
should be patent-eligible.52 From the standpoint of appropriate 
innovation policy, the most attractive reading of this abstraction 
test is that it targets overly broad scope.53 Numerous 
commentators have made persuasive arguments that proprietary 
rights of excessive scope imperil innovation.54 Whether concerns 
about broad scope are couched in the language of 
                                                     
 45. Supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 46. Supra note 26. 
 47. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 187–89; Nathan Oleen, Software Patent 
Debate: Will the U.S. Supreme Court Weigh In?, TECH., MFG. & TRANSP. INDUS. 
INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.tmtindustryinsider.com/2013/09/27/software-
patent-debate-will-the-u-s-supreme-court-weigh-in/ (commenting on the “long 
running and heated debate” over the patent eligibility of software patents and noting 
that the “uncertainty [of standards for software patents] has led to a number of 
conflicting and arguably irreconcilable decisions”). 
 48. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981). 
 49. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225–27 (2010). 
 50. Id. at 3227. 
 51. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 52. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227, 3231. (disapproving of an exclusive machine-or-
transformation test and instead holding that “[t]he patent application here can be 
rejected under our precedents on the unpatentability of abstract ideas”). 
 53. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1328–29 
(2011). 
 54. A classic reference in patent law is Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, 
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908–09 (1990), 
which states that issuing broad patents in cumulative technologies has led to 
blockages in innovation. See also Cohen & Lemley, supra note 1, at 52. 
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“infrastructure,”55 “platform technology,”56 “basic research,”57 or 
preemption of future work,58 such concerns are ubiquitous.59 
Similarly, in the trilogy of Section 101 cases the Supreme Court 
has decided over the last three years—the 2010 decision in Bilski 
v. Kappos, the 2012 decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., and most recently the 2013 
decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc.—the Court has invoked scope.60 In Bilski, the 
majority opinion argued that proprietary rights over abstract 
ideas, such as the idea of hedging risk in commodities markets 
claimed by the applicant, could “pre-empt” future innovation.61 
The Court’s unanimous decision in Mayo, rendered in the context 
of applying patentable subject matter doctrine to a diagnostic 
testing patent, also discussed the danger of patent grants on laws 
of nature “inhibit[ing] future innovation premised upon them.”62 
Similarly, in Myriad, the Court struck down certain gene patent 
claims in the context of cautioning against inhibitions on future 
research.63 
Actually applying the patentable subject matter requirement 
to police scope can, however, be quite challenging, even for 
Supreme Court Justices. In Mayo, for example, the unanimous 
                                                     
 55. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED 
RESOURCES 282, 286–87 (2012); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of 
Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 923–24 (2005). 
 56. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 107–09 (2003). 
 57. Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 109 (1999). 
 58. See Rai, supra note 20, at 829 (expressing concern for the patent grant’s ability 
to limit future work). 
 59. Patent practitioners often argue Section 112 is the appropriate mechanism for 
policing scope. Although Section 112 is adequate in most cases, it may not be fully 
effective. The factual situation facing the Supreme Court in its most recent Section 101 
case, AMP v. Myriad Genetics, illustrates the limitations of Section 112. Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110–14 (2013). That case 
included claims covering genomic DNA (gDNA) encoding BRCA1 and BRCA2 
polypeptides that had simply been isolated from the human chromosome. Id. at 2112–13. 
At least some of the gDNA claims probably met the requirements of Section 112—they 
appeared enabled, definite, and adequately described. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (listing 
the requirements for specification of inventions). Nonetheless, the claim presented serious 
obstacles to independent work on discovering mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2. Arti K. 
Rai & Robert Cook-Deegan, Moving Beyond “Isolated” Gene Patents, SCIENCE, July 12, 
2013, at 137, 138. The gDNA patents also cast a shadow of infringement liability over 
whole genome sequencing. Id. 
 60. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (invoking scope while citing Mayo). 
 61. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225, 3231 (2010). 
 62. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 
1301 (2012). 
 63. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2111, 2116–18. 
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Court rejected on subject matter grounds a claim on 
administration of a thiopurine drug that was quite narrow.64 
These judicial challenges in applying Section 101 caution against 
allowing examiners to wield the requirement liberally. 
Regardless of whether courts can successfully use the test within 
the relatively small number of cases they have to adjudicate,65 a 
sophisticated approach to Section 101 is unlikely to be a useful 
tool in the mine run of cases that examiners must address in an 
average time allotment of about twenty to forty hours.66 Although 
a crude and underinclusive machine-or-transformation test 
should have some utility, patentable subject matter doctrine has 
limited potential at the initial examination stage.67 
B. A Robust Nonobviousness Standard 
As a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
2007 case of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., examiners 
making an obviousness rejection no longer have to bear the 
considerable administrative burden of finding a specific written 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation (TSM) to combine prior art 
when they reject a patent application.68 While the Court’s 
                                                     
 64. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294–95. The claim covered adjusting 
thiopurine drug dosage according to whether metabolite levels of the drug fell within a specific 
picomole per red blood cell range. Id. at 1295. For its part, the Federal Circuit has also 
struggled mightily with questions of subject matter eligibility. However, the lower court’s 
struggle may reflect not so much challenges of application but instead a deep division over 
whether, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s views, Section 101 should play any significant 
role. The range of division was on full display in the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in the 
§ 101 software case. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273–84, 1292–
93 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (showing the differences between the majority and concurrence). 
The only conclusion that drew a majority (based on different rationales) was that the relevant 
method claims in the patents were invalid. Id. at 1273–84, 1292–1305. 
 65. Some would argue that Section 101 questions are sufficiently challenging that even 
courts should try to adjudicating them if an “easier” issue involving less controversy could 
conclusively resolve the case. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating 
Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1673, 1681 (2010) (offering a pragmatic rationale for avoiding Section 101 decisions). That said, 
some courts have granted motions to dismiss on Section 101 grounds when the claim in 
question was broad and lacked a machine or transformation. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion 
and Order at 4–5, Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Rackspace Hosting, Inc., No. 6:12-CV-375 (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 27, 2013). 
 66. Rai, supra note 12, at 2063–64 (discussing time allotment, which is based on the 
technological complexity of the applications the examiner receives and examiner GS level). 
 67. See Crouch & Merges, supra note 65, at 1690 (noting that subject matter eligibility is 
difficult for anyone to implement at the initial examination stage). 
 68. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2007); see Rai, supra note 12, at 
2053 n.9 (explaining the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the TSM requirement). Notably, in 
that case, the PTO successfully worked with the Justice Department’s Office of the Solicitor 
General to shape Supreme Court interest in, and reform of, the Federal Circuit’s TSM 
requirement. Id. 
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rejection of a rigid TSM test makes it easier for examiners to 
reject software applications that are merely straightforward 
combinations of pre-existing art,69 the nonobviousness standard 
at the PTO is still some distance from a sophisticated economic 
inquiry that would grant patents only when necessary to induce 
innovation (i.e., either initial invention or subsequent 
development).70 Such an inquiry would presumably have 
significant force in the area of software, where copyright, first-
mover advantages, network effects, and layering of services on 
top of software code (particularly prevalent in open-source 
models) provide considerable incentive to innovate independent 
of patents.71 
For purposes of initial examination, however, such an 
economically sophisticated inquiry would be quite costly to 
administer. The ordinary nonobviousness test enunciated in the 
case law, which uses a scientific and technical inquiry into prior 
art as a proxy for assessing the larger economic question, is 
difficult enough to administer.72 
C. Resolving Issues of Excessive Breadth and Vagueness 
For the reasons noted above, patentable subject matter and 
nonobviousness are unlikely to operate as robust mechanisms for 
initial screening at the PTO. However, Section 112 tools that target 
excessive breadth and vagueness could usefully be deployed. The 
PTO recognized this point in a set of Section 112 guidelines focused 
on computer-enabled inventions that it issued in February 2011.73 
In January 2013, the PTO went a step further, requesting 
comments on claims that use functional language and commentary 
on the preparation of patent applications.74 President Obama’s June 
2013 Executive Order hews closely to these ongoing PTO efforts.75 
                                                     
 69. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418–19 (demonstrating the Court’s rejection of a 
rigid TSM test). 
 70. Cf. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of 
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1599 (2011) (advocating for a dynamic inducement 
standard). 
 71. See id. at 1601–02, 1614–15 (emphasizing that mechanisms in the field of software 
other than patents provide inducement for innovation). 
 72. Cf. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417–18 (offering an example of case law that uses the 
ordinary nonobviousness test). 
 73. See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 
U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 
7167–68 (Feb. 9, 2011) (providing examiners guidance on Section 112). 
 74. Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for 
Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292, 292–95 (Jan. 3, 2013). 
 75. Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, supra note 17. 
Thus even for those who are wary of aggressive assertions of presidential power over 
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Before turning to the specifics of how three Section 112 
requirements—definiteness, scope given to functional claims, and 
written description—could usefully be deployed, I first address 
how concerns regarding breadth and vagueness are distinct 
conceptually but can overlap as a practical matter. 
As a conceptual matter, breadth and vagueness are quite 
distinct. Consider, for example, the first claim of the Bilski 
patent, which purported to cover any method for hedging risk in 
commodity markets.76 Although this claim was relatively clear in 
terms of delineating boundaries, it was quite broad.77 Similarly, 
vagueness is an issue separate from breadth. For example, in the 
2005 case of Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit struck down as unduly vague a patent for 
software used to create an “aesthetically pleasing” kiosk 
interface.78 According to the court, the specification failed to 
provide a “workable objective standard” for determining the 
meaning of “aesthetically pleasing.”79 The issue in Datamize was 
not breadth but notice.80 
Although breadth and vagueness are distinct conceptually, 
they can also overlap, particularly in the area of functional 
claiming. This overlap of excessive breadth and vagueness is 
perhaps most apparent with respect to functional claiming in the 
biological sciences. For example, in Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., a 2010 case decided en banc by the Federal Circuit, 
the patentee claimed a method for selectively inhibiting a 
biological pathway, the NF-kB cell signaling pathway, that is 
implicated in a broad range of disease processes.81 The claim thus 
covered the entire genus of molecules that would work by 
selectively inhibiting that pathway, even though at the time of 
patent filing neither the patentee nor potential infringers knew 
the structure of any of these molecules with any specificity.82 
Indeed, only well after the application was filed did either the 
patentee, Ariad, or the infringer, Eli Lilly, determine that the 
accused molecules, Eli Lilly’s Evista and Xigris, in fact worked by 
                                                     
executive branch agencies, the order should be unproblematic. It simply emphasizes what 
the PTO has been doing. 
 76. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223–24 (2010). 
 77. See id. at 3233–34. 
 78. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1344, 1354–55 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 79. Id. at 1350. 
 80. See id. (emphasizing the importance of providing direction to the public). 
 81. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(en banc). 
 82. See id. at 1341 (indicating that the specification hypothesized three types of 
molecules that might reduce NF-kB activity). 
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inhibiting NF-kB signaling.83 Thus the functional claims at issue 
in Ariad were not simply overly broad. They also did not 
adequately delineate boundaries. 
The type of notice problem found in Ariad (and the biological 
sciences more generally) is not precisely mirrored by functional 
claiming in software. Unlike Eli Lilly in the Ariad case, the 
potential software patent infringement defendant presumably 
knows how her software functions. Even in software, however, if 
software designers actually want to do freedom-to-operate 
searches for patents, such patents would probably be easier to 
search (and certainly to understand) if some structure—for 
example, a detailed algorithm—were included in the 
specification. The search strategy for examiners would 
presumably also be easier to implement. 
In the next Part, I discuss in detail the three Section 112 
requirements I see as key for controlling breadth and 
vagueness—definiteness, scope limitations associated with 
means or step plus function claiming, and written description. I 
also note the manner in which, with respect to each requirement, 
the PTO has pushed the envelope in useful ways and could go 
even further. 
IV. THE KEY SECTION 112 REQUIREMENTS 
A. Definiteness 
The definiteness requirement emerges from the patent 
statute’s requirement that the patent specification “shall 
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a 
joint inventor regards as the invention.”84 This requirement has 
long been understood as playing a key role in promoting the goal 
of notice. For example, as the Supreme Court observed in 1942, 
requirements of particularity and distinctness serve innovation 
policy goals by “distinguish[ing] what is claimed from what went 
before in the art and clearly circumscrib[ing] what is foreclosed 
from future enterprise.”85 Indeed, “[a] zone of uncertainty which 
enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of 
infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less 
than unequivocal foreclosure.”86 
                                                     
 83. See id. at 1340–41 (stating that Ariad filed a patent application in April 1989 
and brought suit against Eli Lilly in June 2002—the day after the patent issued). 
 84. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 85. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942). 
 86. Id. 
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Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the 
regional federal courts of appeal adhered faithfully to the 
Supreme Court standard. As the Third Circuit stated in 1981, 
“The definiteness requirement is more than a linguistic 
quibble . . . . Its purpose is to demarcate the boundaries of the 
purported invention, in order to provide notice to others of the 
limits beyond which experimentation and invention are 
undertaken at the risk of infringement.”87 By the 1990s, however, 
the definiteness requirement had assumed a more limited role, at 
least in the context of court challenges. One study found that 
only 5.8% of judicial invalidations in this time period were based 
on indefiniteness.88 In 2001, the Federal Circuit took a significant 
step towards further relaxing the definiteness requirement. In 
Exxon Research & Engineering Co. v. United States, the court 
determined that, at least in the context of litigation, claims were 
indefinite only where they were “insolubly ambiguous, and no 
narrowing construction [could] properly be adopted.”89 With 
Exxon Engineering, the Federal Circuit clearly took a significant 
turn away from requiring notice ex ante. 
Exxon Engineering did suggest in passing, however, that a 
different indefiniteness standard might be appropriate at the 
PTO.90 In September 2008, the PTO’s then-Deputy Commissioner 
for Patent Examination Policy, John Love, took up the suggestion 
with vigor, instructing examiners that they could reject claim 
language that had “more than one reasonable interpretation.”91 
In its November 2008 Ex parte Miyazaki decision, the PTO’s 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) similarly held 
that “if a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim 
constructions,” an examiner is justified in invoking indefiniteness 
to require that the applicant more precisely define the metes and 
bounds of the claimed invention.92 
                                                     
 87. See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Norton Co. v. Bendix Corp., 449 F.2d 553, 555 (2d Cir. 1971)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Ellipse Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 452 F.2d 163, 169–70 
(7th Cir. 1971); Norton, 449 F.2d at 557. 
 88. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 207–08 (1998). 
 89. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 90. See id. at 1384 (suggesting the examiner might demand that the applicant more 
clearly define the invention). 
 91. Memorandum from John Love, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, 
to Tech. Ctr. Dirs. & Patent Examining Corps 2 (Sept. 2, 2008), available at http:// 
www.uspto.gov/web/patents/memoranda.htm. 
 92. Ex parte Miyazaki, No. 2007-3300, 2008 WL 5105055, at *5 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 19, 
2008). 
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The first part of the PTO’s two-part February 2011 
guidelines is entirely devoted to highlighting the definiteness 
requirement as it should be applied in light of Miyazaki.93 The 
guidelines particularly emphasize the need for definiteness 
requirements to be met when the claims in question use 
functional language.94 Such language includes, but is not limited 
to, situations (discussed further below) where it could be argued 
that a claim is invoking Section 112(f).95 
In general, according to the PTO, the February 2011 
guidelines have led to a 20% increase in Section 112 rejections.96 
Additionally, with respect to definiteness in particular, we have 
some evidence suggesting that definiteness can be applied in the 
software context, even by examiners who are highly time 
constrained. This evidence emerges from data I have gathered on 
the performance of an Art Unit that was set up in 1999 to 
examine one specific category of software application—software 
applied to biological systems, or bioinformatics. 
In the late 1990s, as the project to sequence the human 
genome was entering into full force, the PTO began to receive 
patent applications in the area of bioinformatics.97 Such 
applications went to examiners in many diverse Art Units, often 
Art Units outside PTO’s “Technology Center 1600,” which 
handles biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.98 The real problem 
with these applications was not one of inappropriate assignment, 
however. Rather, as the Director of Technology Center 1600, 
Jasemine Chambers, noted at the time, “the claims [in these 
applications] are very broadly written . . . frequently to the point 
of incomprehensibility.”99 In order to examine these applications 
                                                     
 93. See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 
35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 
7162, 7163–70 (Feb. 9, 2011) (setting examination guidelines around definite claim 
language). 
 94. See id. at 7164–65 (discussing functional claiming). 
 95. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. V 2011) (amending the last undesignated paragraph 
by inserting “(f) Element for a Claim in Combination—An element”). 
 96. Kappos, supra note 18. 
 97. See Douglas Steinberg, New PTO Unit Examines Bioinformatics Applications, 
SCIENTIST (Nov. 27, 2000), http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/13144/ 
title/New-PTO-Unit-Examines-Bioinformatics-Applications/ (reporting the “flood of 
filings” received by the PTO regarding patent applications for bioinformatics inventions); 
see also Scott D. Locke & David A. Kalow, Preparing for Bioinformatics Litigation: How 
Will the Courts Confront the Next Generation of Biotechnology Patents?, 1 BUFF. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 76, 78 (2001) (stating that the first stage of the Human Genome Project was 
completed in 2000). 
 98. Steinberg, supra note 97; see also Todd Dickinson, Commissioner’s Page, PTO 
TODAY, Mar. 2000, at 2. 
 99. Steinberg, supra note 97. 
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appropriately, the PTO set up Art Unit 1631 (AU 1631).100 AU 
1631 consists of biologically trained examiners who also have 
some familiarity with computer science.101 The examiners are not, 
however, given any more time to examine these applications than 
comparable examiners in other Art Units that process software 
applications.102 
Nonetheless, according to data I have gathered, 73% of all 
AU 1631 applications filed in calendar year 2003 sustained a 
definiteness rejection in the first round of examination.103 
To overcome a definiteness rejection, the applicant either 
has to provide further information about the meaning of the term 
or has to replace it with an alternative term that is not subject to 
ambiguity.104 Consistent use of definiteness rejections would 
                                                     
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.; Interview with Marjorie Moran, head of Art Unit 1631, and George Elliott, 
TC 1600 head (May 16, 2012). 
 102. Allocation of hours is based on a combination of the technology class into which 
applications in a given Art Unit are deemed to fall and the examiner’s seniority level. The 
technology class assigned to AU 1631 applications (Class 703 Data Processing: Structural 
Design, Modeling, Simulation, and Emulation) is a traditional “software” class. More 
generally examiners in AU 1631 face the conventional incentives faced by examiners at 
the PTO: The compensation system under which they receive credits, or “counts,” for two 
specific actions taken during the initial examination period—“first office actions” and 
“disposals.” Rai, supra note 12, at 2063 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
[E]xaminer[s] receive[ ] first-office-action count[s] by making a preliminary 
communication to the applicant as to whether the application is allowable 
(thereby permitting the applicant to amend claims as necessary or to contest the 
examiner’s conclusion). A variety of actions on the part of either the examiner or 
the applicant can produce a subsequent disposal count. Such actions included 
allowance of the application and abandonment . . . .  
Id. 
 103. Rai, supra note 19. The data from this Art Unit (which is from calendar year 
2003) suggest that, even during the period after Exxon Engineering and before Miyazaki, at 
least some examiners continued to view definiteness as a robust requirement. Indeed, even 
after Exxon Engineering, the PTO continued to adhere in its Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (MPEP) to the ten definiteness-related form paragraphs it first enunciated in 1995. 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(d) 
(8th ed. Rev. 1, Feb. 2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/pac/mpep/old/E8R1_700.pdf. These include a form paragraph on relative terms 
that emphasizes notice. Id. A 2003 revision to the eighth edition of the MPEP also 
emphasizes the overarching goal of notice for all definiteness rejections. Id. In 
considering whether the requisite notice function has been served, the examiner 
must determine whether there is “clear warning to others as to what constitutes 
infringement of the patent.” Id. § 2173.02. Exxon Engineering is ultimately 
mentioned in a 2012 revision to the MPEP but only in passing. U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173.02 (8th ed. 
Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter USPTO 2012 MANUAL], available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2100.pdf. 
 104. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2173.02 (8th ed. Rev. 3, Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/E8R3_2100.pdf. 
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presumably motivate applicants to define terms better ex ante.105 
Thus, even without the potentially contentious glossary 
requirement currently being mooted by both the PTO and 
President Obama, we would see greater applicant use of such 
glossaries where appropriate.106 Of course, any glossary would 
itself have to be examined to ensure it actually furthered 
compliance with the definiteness requirement.107 
The PTO’s February 2011 guidelines also discuss in detail 
the important interaction of the definiteness requirement with 
means, or step, plus function claiming under Section 112(f).108 
More generally, the guidelines discuss at length restrictions on 
scope associated with 112(f) claiming.109 I turn next to the issue of 
112(f) claiming. 
B. Claiming Under 112(f) 
While the Federal Circuit has adopted a lax view of 
definiteness generally, it has deployed the requirement more 
vigorously in the context of means-plus-function claim 
limitations.110 Of late, the Federal Circuit has been relatively 
assertive in striking down as indefinite Section 112(f) software 
                                                     
 105. See USPTO 2012 MANUAL, supra note 103, § 2173.02 (“It is highly desirable 
to have applicants resolve ambiguity by amending the claims during prosecution of the 
application rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in subsequent litigation of the 
issued patent.”). 
 106. Both the PTO’s January 2013 Request for Comments on Preparation of Patent 
Applications and the President’s June 2013 Executive Order refer to the possibility of a 
glossary requirement. See Request for Comments on Preparation of Patent Applications, 
78 Fed. Reg. 2960, 2961 (Jan. 15, 2013); Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech 
Patent Issues, supra note 17. Comments on such a requirement have been negative, not 
only from patent bar groups that have objected to added burdens, but also from groups 
that favor stricter standards for patent validity such as the IT-firm heavy Coalition for 
Patent Fairness (CPF). See, e.g., Letter from Joseph M. Potenza, Intellectual Prop. Law 
Section Chair, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Margaret Focarino, Comm’r for Patents, U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office 5–6 (Mar. 18, 2013) (advocating against the adoption of glossaries in 
response to request for comments on preparation of patent applications); Comments of the 
Coalition for Patent Fairness in Response to Request for Comments on Preparation of 
Patent Applications, No. PTO-P-2011-0046, at 19–20 (Apr. 15, 2013) [hereinafter 
Comments of the Coalition for Patent Fairness] (same). 
 107. Comments of the Coalition for Patent Fairness, supra note 106, at 19–20. 
 108. See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 
35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 
7162, 7164–65 (Feb. 9, 2011) (discussing functional claiming and the definiteness 
requirement). 
 109. Id. at 7167–68. 
 110. See Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“In cases involving a computer-implemented invention in which the 
inventor has invoked means-plus-function claiming, this court has consistently required 
that the structure disclosed in the specification be more than simply a general purpose 
computer or microprocessor.”). 
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claim limitations that contain no accompanying disclosure of 
algorithm.111 In these cases, the Federal Circuit has held that 
appropriate structure cannot be a general purpose computer but 
rather must be the special purpose computer created when a 
general purpose computer runs the disclosed algorithm.112 The 
PTO’s February 2011 guidelines emphasize these cases at 
length.113 
Because of this potential for indefiniteness, and because all 
112(f) claims are, under the terms of the patent statute, limited 
to the structure, materials, or acts disclosed in the 
specification,114 the issue of what constitutes a 112(f) claim can 
become very important. The February 2011 guidelines emphasize 
that claims need not specifically recite “means for” or “step for” 
language in order to fall within 112(f).115 Nonstructural terms like 
“mechanism for,” “module for,” “device for,” “unit for,” 
“component for,” “element for,” “member for,” “apparatus for,” 
“machine for,” “system for,” and the like will be deemed to invoke 
112(f).116 The guidelines further cite the PTO’s own 
administrative case law for the proposition that examiners 
should specifically check either the specification, established 
dictionaries, or prior art to ensure that a particular claim invokes 
structure that will safely take it outside the bounds of 112(f).117 
At the same time, the PTO guidelines equivocate somewhat 
by dutifully noting Federal Circuit cases holding that if a claim 
limitation does not use the canonical “means for” or “step for” 
language, it is presumptively not within 112(f).118 According to 
the Federal Circuit, this “strong” presumption must be overcome 
                                                     
 111. See, e.g., Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (holding that the software claim was indefinite under Section 112(f) because the 
patent must disclose, at least to the satisfaction of one of ordinary skill in the art, enough 
of an algorithm to provide the necessary structure); Aristocrat Techs., 521 F.3d at 1338 
(holding that the software claim was indefinite under Section 112(f) for failing to disclose 
the algorithm). 
 112. Finisar Corp., 523 F.3d at 1340. In its 1994 In re Alappat decision, the Federal 
Circuit held en banc that software run on a general purpose computer creates a special 
purpose computer that is patent-eligible. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (en banc), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 113. Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 
35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
7168 (citing Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. and Finisar Corp.). 
 114. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). 
 115. Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 
35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
7167. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 7167 & n.68; see also Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 
F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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by showing that the claim limitation contains no structural 
language.119 
Professor Mark Lemley has recently argued that a less 
formalistic approach to determining what claim limitations fall 
within the 112(f) box is not only a good idea as a policy matter 
but is also a sensible construction of the 1952 patent statute that 
enacted 112(f).120 As Lemley rightly points out, under current 
Federal Circuit case law, a claim limitation to a “computer 
programmed” to perform a certain function might not fall within 
the means-plus-function category.121 In contrast, a claim 
limitation to a “means for” performing the same function would 
fall within 112(f), thereby requiring algorithmic support in the 
specification and with scope limited to that algorithm plus 
equivalents.122 
Lemley appears to contemplate 112(f) expansion through 
judicial decision-making.123 Even so, the PTO has recently asked 
for commentary about whether the agency should treat claim 
limitations that recite a computer for performing certain 
functions as invoking 112(f), even if the claim limitations are not 
set forth in conventional means-plus-function format.124 
The PTO would be venturing somewhat beyond existing case 
law if it set forth a guideline instructing examiners to apply 
112(f) broadly in the context of any claim limitation (irrespective 
of how it was worded) for which the only structure disclosed was 
a computer. In and of itself, this sort of PTO entrepreneurship in 
creating test cases is hardly unusual. The PTO has previously 
brought test cases involving such validity requirements as utility 
and nonobviousness.125 Here, the challenge for purposes of 
bringing a test case would be that application of 112(f) does not 
necessarily lead to a rejection. Unless the applicant disagrees 
with 112(f) application, the rejection must take place on other 
grounds.126 And even if the applicant disagrees, the current path 
                                                     
 119. Lighting World, Inc., 382 F.3d at 1358. 
 120. Lemley, supra note 29, at 943–49. 
 121. Id. at 944–47. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 928–30, 948 (“[T]his is a problem courts have created, and . . . courts 
should be the ones who solve it.”). 
 124. Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for 
Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292, 294 (Jan. 3, 
2013). 
 125. Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the Federal Circuit?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 
342–44 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/12/20/rai.html. 
 126. See, e.g., Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, In the Matter of 
Request for Comments and Notice Regarding Preparation of Patent Applications 6–7, No. 
PTO-P-2011-0046 (Mar. 25, 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/files/eff_pto_ 
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for appeal of such disagreement is not entirely clear.127 So, the 
PTO would have to think very carefully about ensuring that any 
guidelines it put forward could actually result in a test case. 
Moreover, in any test case involving 112(f) brought up 
through an ordinary rejection, the PTO would receive no formal 
deference from the Federal Circuit on its legal construction.128 By 
contrast, if the issue of 112(f) construction came up through a 
challenge to a granted patent under the AIA’s new post-grant 
review procedure, any PTO position should receive Chevron 
deference.129 
Another important challenge to applying 112(f) capaciously 
is ensuring that not too much pressure is placed on this single 
requirement. When a huge amount turns on any single type of line-
drawing, huge resources will be devoted to disputes over such line-
drawing. Fortunately, as discussed in the next Subpart, much of the 
work in ensuring appropriate structure, even for claim limitations 
that are deemed not to fall within 112(f), can be done through 
appropriate application of the written description requirement. 
C. Written Description 
In relevant part, Section 112(a) of the patent statute requires 
that the patent specification contain 
a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which 
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same.130 
The reference to “written description” in this paragraph has 
been the subject of textualist parsing, most recently in the 2010 
                                                     
comments_regarding_patent_clarity.pdf (explaining that the applicant should be required 
to agree or disagree with the application of 112(f) and that if the applicant agrees with the 
application of 112(f), the claim obviously cannot be rejected on the grounds that 112(f) 
applies). 
 127. But see id. at 7 (indicating that current form paragraphs provide grounds for a 
rejection based on disagreement over the application of 112(f), and suggesting different 
options for applicants who disagree). The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) comments 
also make the valuable point that any 112(f) construction made by the examiner should 
not only be clear from the record, but the examiner should clearly secure the applicant’s 
agreement. Id. at 8. Otherwise the patent may issue under a 112(f) construction, and the 
patentee may try to argue for a broader construction in litigation. Id. 
 128. In re Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[C]laim 
construction by the PTO is a question of law that we review de novo . . . .”). 
 129. See infra Part V.C (discussing doctrinal argument for the Federal Circuit 
applying Chevron deference when reviewing legal determinations made by the PTO in 
post-grant and inter partes review proceedings under the AIA). 
 130. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
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en banc Federal Circuit decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
v. Eli Lilly & Co.131 Lawyers and Federal Circuit judges have 
used textualist tools to parse whether written description 
constitutes a separate requirement, judged by its own 
standards,132 or whether the appropriate standard by which to 
judge written description is simply enablement—that is, whether 
the written description “enable[s]” persons skilled in the art “to 
make and use the same.”133 
Even to some of its practitioners, however, this textualist 
parsing ultimately proves unsatisfactory. For example, although 
Judge Lourie’s majority opinion in Ariad notes that the existence of 
a comma after the term “making and using it” within 
Section 112 (a) supports written description as a separate 
requirement,134 he acknowledges that the issue should not, at the 
end of the day, turn on grammatical nuance.135 
Determining the proper role (if any) for a separate written 
description requirement calls for attention to history and function. 
The original Patent Act of 1790 contemplated written description 
performing a notice function, in significant part because claims 
were not a part of the first patents.136 The argument against a 
separate written description requirement thus emphasizes that 
claims, instituted in 1836, now perform the notice function, at least 
when the claims are not changed over the course of the 
prosecution.137 The view is encapsulated in the patent law maxim 
that original claims provide their own written description.138 
This maxim has some merit, particularly to the extent that the 
definiteness requirement can be used to ensure that claims actually 
identify clearly what is being claimed. Even for original claims, 
however, written description can play an important role. 
Originally filed functional claims, such as the claims at issue in 
Ariad, pose problems for notice.139 These problems cannot be 
                                                     
 131. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1342, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
 132. Id. at 1343–44. 
 133. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 134. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1343–45. 
 135. Id. at 1360. 
 136. Id. at 1345; Lemley, supra note 29, at 910–11. 
 137. See generally Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1288 
(2012) (stating that claims were not required prior to 1836). 
 138. See, e.g., Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 
112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1100 (Jan. 5, 2001) 
(discussing the original claim doctrine’s interaction with the written description 
requirement). 
 139. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1347 (“Claims define and circumscribe, the written 
description discloses and teaches.”); see also Lemley, supra note 29, at 915 (“[B]road 
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adequately addressed through even a capacious requirement of 
definiteness—for example, a requirement that would strike down 
any term that was susceptible to more than one interpretation. 
In the case of the Ariad claim, the problem was not that the 
person having skill in the art would have been unclear about 
what the claim terms meant. Rather, from reading the patent 
document, the skilled artisan would not have known what sorts 
of molecules actually performed the function.140 In the notice 
context (as contrasted with the enablement context), the skilled 
artisan should not have to engage in experimentation.141 
Notice is important not only for potential infringers but also 
for PTO examiners. In its Ariad brief, the PTO made a version of 
the notice argument, arguing if an invention is claimed solely by 
reference to “function or effect,” it may be enabled but is 
nonetheless very difficult to examine.142 
Though such claims may be enabled, PTO is not an 
experimental laboratory: it lacks both the facilities and the 
statutory mandate to determine, through empirical testing, 
whether any of millions of prior art inventions may have 
exhibited the recited function.143 
As noted earlier, the notice problem posed by functional 
claiming in biopharmaceuticals is not precisely the same as that 
posed by functional claiming in the context of most software.144 In 
general, those who write code not only do so with a particular 
function in mind but also disclose that function. Even so, for 
both the PTO and potential infringers, searching patents is 
presumably easier when the patent’s specification contains 
significant structural disclosure. 
Used properly, written description can do more than 
improve notice. It can also regulate appropriate patent scope. 
To be sure, as many others and I have argued, certain 
interpretations of written description are unduly formalistic 
and narrow scope too dramatically. For example, a 
requirement that obliged applicants to describe every 
structural embodiment encompassed by their claim—even 
structural embodiments that were just a mechanistic extension 
                                                     
functional language . . . did not sufficiently put the world on notice of what the patentee 
was removing from the world.”). 
 140. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351, 1355. 
 141. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. 
 142. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support 
of Respondent at 21, Ariad, 598 F.3d 1336 (No. 2008-1248). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See supra Part III.C. 
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of listed embodiments—would go too far.145 Current 
interpretations of written description are not so formalistic, 
however. Ariad’s author, Judge Lourie, was presumably able to 
secure the large majority he did by moving beyond the highly 
formalistic, and flawed, vision of his 1997 decision in Regents of 
the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. While the 1997 
decision appeared to require those claiming gene sequences to 
promulgate in their specification a nucleotide-by-nucleotide 
recitation of structure, Ariad explicitly disavows the need for 
such mechanical recitations.146 In fact, the decision suggests that 
written description should invoke certain contextual factors 
similar to those used in enablement analysis—“the existing 
knowledge in the particular field, the extent and context of the 
prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, [and] the 
predictability of the aspect at issue.”147 
Of course, for purposes of conceptual clarity, and in order for 
the requirement to be truly useful in curbing scope, written 
description should play a role distinct from that played by 
enablement. Kevin Collins, commenting on the Ariad decision, has 
suggested a useful clarifying distinction. He has suggested that the 
written description requirement might be seen as playing a role 
with respect to all claims similar to that played by the Section 112(f) 
reference to structure for the subset of claims deemed to fall within 
112(f).148 In other words, if the specification contains no structure 
with respect to a given claim limitation, the claim limitation should 
fail written description. If the specification provides some structure, 
then the applicant is entitled to claim scope that includes that 
structure and equivalents thereof (with equivalents being judged as 
of the time of filing).149 As discussed further below, this is also the 
approach to written description that the bioinformatics Art Unit 
appears to have taken.150  
                                                     
 145. See Rai, supra note 3, at 1072–73 (discussing how narrow scope can become a 
problem as research moves downstream). 
 146. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 
(Fed. Cir. 1997), with Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. 
 147. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (alteration in original) (quoting Capon v. Eshhar, 418 
F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 148. See Kevin E. Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the 
Baseline of Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 
60, 62–65. 
 149. Id. at 63–64. Similarly, a plethora of comments to the PTO’s recent January 
2013 request for comments emphasizes the importance of applying written description to 
software, citing Ariad for the proposition that written description requires structural 
support for functional claiming even where the specification is enabling. See Comments of 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 126, at 10. 
 150. See infra text accompanying notes 154–60. 
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For the examiner, monitoring compliance with written 
description should not pose a significant burden. If the applicant 
has failed to disclose any structure within the four corners of the 
patent document, a written description rejection should not only 
be easy to make but also to sustain.151 In contrast, a rejection 
based on lack of compliance with enablement may be difficult to 
sustain if the applicant chooses to rebut through extensive 
evidentiary showings of what the applicant considers ordinary 
skill in the art.152 At the same time, applicant compliance with 
written description should also be relatively straightforward. To 
the extent a claim is enabled, it should not be difficult for the 
applicant to show some structure in the specification. 
Some commentators have noted the relatively sparse 
occurrence of written description issues in appeals of patent 
rejections to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (now 
the Patent Trials and Appeals Board) to question whether 
written description is indeed useful at the PTO.153 In cases where 
the specification provides no structure, however, the grounds for 
an appeal of an examiner’s rejection are likely to be tenuous at 
best. Data on the use of written description at the examiner level 
are more meaningful. Notably, in the bioinformatics Art Unit 
that I have studied, 28% of applications received written 
description rejections.154 
Various patent applications from AU 1631 also illustrate 
well the role that written description could play in software. In 
one case, the applicant claimed the use of “Quadratic 
Discrimination Analysis” to determine the translation initiation 
codon in a nucleotide sequence.155 The applicant’s specification 
did not, however, provide an actual algorithm.156 In rejecting the 
application, the examiner noted that while the specification 
disclosed certain scoring procedures applied to training sets to 
generate optimal “feature variables,” the application provided no 
written description of a specific algorithm as it related to those 
variables.157 
                                                     
 151. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. 
 152. See USPTO 2012 MANUAL, supra note 103, § 2164.05 (describing evidence that 
may be presented by applicant). 
 153. Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A 
Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and 
PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 78–82 (2007). 
 154. Rai, supra note 19. 
 155. U.S. Patent Application No. 10/620,796 (filed July 16, 2003). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Letter from Pablo S. Whaley, Patent Exam’r, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
to Jack E. Tabaska, Application No. 10/620,796, at 6–7 (May 18, 2006), http://portal.uspto. 
gov/pair/view/BrowsePdfServlet?objectId=ENDN79HZPP1GUI3&lang=DINO. 
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In other cases, the software application in question explicitly 
used means-plus-function language.158 Just as Kevin Collins’s 
analysis of written description would suggest, examiners in 
AU 1631 equated written description and indefiniteness, holding 
that lack of structure in the specification raised problems for 
both requirements.159 As noted, however, written description 
applies as a requirement for all claim limitations, not just 
limitations to which 112(f) is deemed applicable.160 
In 2003, when examiners in AU 1631 were applying written 
description liberally to software, the question of whether the 
doctrine’s application to original claims extended beyond 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals was not clear.161 What was 
creative extension to software in 2003 was ratified by the en banc 
Ariad decision in 2010.162 Without a doubt, then, written 
description can now be applied by the PTO to all software patent 
applications. 
Indeed, the PTO’s February 2011 guidelines discuss in some 
detail the role written description should play in policing 
functional claiming in software.163 They elaborate on the Federal 
Circuit cases that have applied written description to software 
and explicitly extrapolate the holding in Ariad to the software 
context.164 
Written description is far from perfect. Its contours need to 
be developed further.165 Ideally, such development would take 
                                                     
 158. U.S. Patent Application No. 10/465,472 (filed June 19, 2003). 
 159. Collins, supra note 148, at 62–64; Rai, supra note 19. 
 160. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
 161. See generally Mueller, supra note 20, at 617. 
 162. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). Even earlier, a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit had applied written 
description to software in LizardTech v. Earth Research Mapping, a 2005 case involving a 
method of compressing digital images using seamless discrete wavelet transformation 
(DWT). LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Research Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1337, 1344–45 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). There the court used written description to reject the applicant’s attempt 
to claim all methods for using seamless DWT when it had only shown one method for 
performing seamless DWT, a method involving “maintaining updat[ed] sums.” Id. at 
1345–46 (internal quotation marks omitted). And by 2010, a further-refined version of 
written description had become a doctrine accepted by the court as a whole, applicable to 
original claims in all technologies. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349. 
 163. Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 
U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 
7168 (Feb. 9, 2011). 
 164. Id. at 7170–71. 
 165. For example, the recent Federal Circuit trend towards narrowing the so-called 
antibody exception to written description needs to be taken to the logical conclusion of 
eliminating this exception. See Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 
1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“While our precedent suggests that written description for 
certain antibody claims can be satisfied by disclosing a well-characterized antigen, that 
reasoning applies to disclosure of newly characterized antigens where creation of the 
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place with active recognition of the policy role the doctrine can 
play in delineating appropriate scope and improving notice. 
Notably, however, one prominent criticism of the doctrine—that 
it undermines the longstanding patent law principle that a claim 
term can expand in meaning over time, so as to encompass later-
developed technologies unforeseeable at the time of patent 
application166—could be seen as a favorable development, at least 
on balance. 
A full discussion of how later-developed technologies should 
be treated is beyond the scope of this Article.167 For present 
purposes, suffice it to say that allowing key claim terms to 
encompass after-arising technologies obviously undermines 
notice. This practice can also substantially expand scope, 
particularly in the software industry, where the rapid pace of 
change may allow patentees to assert coverage over technologies 
that represent significant improvements over the prior 
technology.168 The policy argument for allowing earlier inventors 
such broad scope is far from clear. Indeed, a substantial 
literature on dividing rights between earlier and subsequent 
inventors suggests that overly broad rights for earlier inventors 
have the potential to diminish downstream research 
inappropriately.169 Thus, a written description requirement that 
was applied through the lens of Section 112(f) jurisprudence 
could play a valuable role in both improving notice and 
regulating scope. 
The foregoing analysis comes with several major caveats. 
First, the extent to which the PTO’s recent emphasis on 
definiteness, restrictions associated with means-plus-function 
claiming, and written description will be successful depends on 
factors like how vigorously examiners are trained on these issues 
and whether evaluations of examination quality take into 
                                                     
claimed antibodies is routine.”). The Federal Circuit has also deemed written description 
to be a strictly factual inquiry, a conclusion that seems peculiar given the emphasis of 
written description doctrine on revealing structure within the four corners of the 
specification. Id. at 1347–48 (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355). 
 166. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1365 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (enunciating this criticism). 
 167. For one recent approach that draws upon linguistic theory, see Collins, supra 
note 148. Rob Merges (who coined the term “temporal paradox” to describe the ability to 
encompass later-developed technologies in earlier-filed claims) and I are currently 
studying this issue further. 
 168. See Lemley, supra note 29, at 955–58. 
 169. Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent 
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 180–81 (2005); Merges & Nelson, supra note 54, 
at 916. For this reason, courts may, in practice, rarely credit significant claim expansion. 
See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1381–83 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(rejecting a broad definition of the claim term “frame” that would have encompassed not 
only character-based protocols but also bit-based protocols). 
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account appropriate attention to these factors. The fact that 
examiner training on the February 2011 guidelines has resulted 
in a 20% increase in Section 112 rejections170 does bode well, 
however. 
Second, even the most vigorous initial examination of 
software patents going forward obviously will not affect the mass 
of poor-quality patents that have already issued.171 However, 
through assertive use of its new post-grant review powers, the 
PTO could play an important role in addressing existing poor-
quality software patents. For these patents, the new inter partes 
review (IPR) proceedings are most relevant.172 From the 
standpoint of policing quality, Congress’s decision to limit these 
proceedings to challenges based on prior art is unfortunate.173 
That said, the one-year period allowed for such review should, in 
contrast to the initial examination process, allow for 
sophisticated use of the nonobviousness requirement.174 
The next Part discusses the role that IPR could play with 
respect to existing patents. It also discusses the post-grant 
review procedure that is available for patents with an effective 
filing date after March 16, 2013. With respect to both of these 
procedures, a key open question is how administrative outcomes 
will be viewed by the courts. 
V.  THE PTO’S NEW POWERS POST-ISSUANCE 
A. Inter Partes Review  
Petitioners who invoke IPR may use patents or printed 
publications to challenge one or more claims on grounds of 
obviousness or lack of novelty.175 The petition will be granted if 
the PTO Director, upon consideration of the petition and any 
response filed by the patentee, finds a “reasonable likelihood that 
the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the 
claims challenged in the petition.”176 As of September 16, 2013 
                                                     
 170. Kappos, supra note 18. 
 171. Cf. Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 
35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 
7162, 7168 (Feb. 9, 2011) (mandating vigorous guidelines for initial examinations of 
software patents without discussion of previously granted applications). 
 172. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review 
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 48,680, 48,682 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 173. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 174. See supra Part III.B (discussing scholars’ advocacy of a sophisticated approach 
to nonobviousness). 
 175. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). 
 176. Id. § 314(a). 
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(one year after the inception of IPR), about 55% (265/485) of IPR 
petitions filed involve patents in the information technology and 
electrical engineering sectors.177 In keeping with the PTO’s 
suggestion that the reasonable likelihood standard is a relatively 
liberal one,178 the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) has 
granted 87% of the petitions upon which it has decided 
(155/178).179 
Petitioners are using IPR with some frequency even though 
it has limited scope as well as a strict estoppel provision that 
prevents the petitioner from raising before a district court or the 
International Trade Commission any ground that it “raised or 
reasonably could have raised” during the IPR.180 The procedure is 
nonetheless attractive because in the administrative context the 
burden of proof for overturning a patent claim is preponderance 
of the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence.181 
For purposes of PTO power, a key variable is whether 
district courts will choose to stay any concurrent litigation 
pending the outcome of the PTO review.182 The AIA contains only 
limited language regarding the circumstances under which 
courts may (or may not) grant such stays.183 Thus much of the 
decision-making will be within the discretion of district courts. In 
the context of the old reexamination system, courts used a three-
factor test when considering contested motions for a stay.184 They 
looked to whether a stay would simplify the issues in question; 
                                                     
 177. HARNESS DICKEY, HARNESSING PATENT OFFICE LITIGATION: VOLUME III (Sept. 
16, 2013), available at http://ipr-pgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/IPR-PGR-Report-
Vol.-31.pdf. 
 178. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review 
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 48,680, 48,702 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“A ‘reasonable likelihood’ requirement is a lower 
threshold than a ‘more likely than not’ requirement.”). 
 179. See HARNESS DICKEY, supra note 177. 
 180. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). 
 181. In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Additionally, 
although the $23,000 IPR fee (filing fee of $9,000 and additional payment of $14,000 if 
review is instituted) is higher than the $8,800 fee for the predecessor (inter partes 
reexamination), it is obviously still much lower than the cost of litigation. USPTO Fee 
Schedule, supra note 14; IPX vs. IPR: A Cheat Sheet, STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX 
P.L.L.C. (2012), available at http://ptolitigationcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/ 
ipx-v-ipr.pdf. 
 182. In 81% of the IPR petitions filed thus far, the patent owner and the patent 
challenger are in concurrent litigation. See HARNESS DICKEY, supra note 177. 
 183.  35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2) (granting an automatic stay of any litigation subsequently 
brought an IPR challenger/petitioner until either “(A) the patent owner moves the court to 
lift the stay; (B) the patent owner files a civil action or counterclaim alleging that the 
petitioner or real party in interest has infringed the patent; or (C) the petitioner or real 
party in interest moves the court to dismiss the civil action”). 
 184. See Southwire Co. v. Cerro Wire, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 775, 778 (E.D. Tex. 2010). 
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the status of the district court proceedings (e.g., whether 
discovery was complete and whether a trial date has been set); 
and prejudice to the nonmoving party.185 When courts applied 
that three-factor test to the old reexamination system, they 
granted contested motions to stay 59% of the time.186 
With respect to the new IPR proceedings, courts have, thus 
far, continued to use the three-factor test.187 Under this test, 
courts should be willing to grant stays more readily than in the 
past. One notorious feature of reexaminations was their 
prolonged duration, on the order of twenty-nine to thirty-eight 
months.188 These reexaminations then had to be appealed to the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.189 By contrast, the 
post-AIA reviews are conducted in the first instance by the newly 
formed PTAB.190 Moreover, they should typically be concluded 
within one year (with an extension of six months in unusual 
cases.)191 As compared with the situation prior to the AIA, this 
relatively expeditious review procedure should tilt all three 
factors in favor of a stay.192 
                                                     
 185. Id.; TouchTunes Music Corp. v. Rowe Int’l Corp., 676 F. Supp. 2d 169, 177 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., LLC, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1023 (N.D. 
Cal. 2005); Argos v. Orthotec LLC, 304 F. Supp. 2d 591, 598 (D. Del. 2004); Xerox Corp. v. 
3Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (W.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 186. See Joshua L. Sohn, Can’t the PTO Get a Little Respect?, 26 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1603, 1611 & n.33 (2011) (citing a 2009 report). Grants were substantially higher in 
the Northern District of California and substantially lower in the Eastern District of 
Texas. See Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures: 
Recent Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 381, 398 (2009) (reporting that the Northern District of California granted 68% 
of stays from 1981 to 2009 while the Eastern District of Texas granted 34% of stays). 
 187. See, e.g., ImageVision.Net, Inc. v. Internet Payment Exch., Inc., No. 12-054-
GMS-MPT, 2013 WL 663535, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 2013); Semiconductor Energy Lab. 
Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-21-JST (JPRx), 2012 WL 7170593, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 19, 2012). 
 188. See Reexaminations—FY 2013, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar. 31, 
2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/Reexamination_operational_ 
statistic_13_Q2.pdf. 
 189. Gardella & Berger, supra note 186, at 383. 
 190. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2012); see also Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,614 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 191. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). 
 192. Both before and after the AIA, software patent cases involving 
nonpracticing entities rather than direct competitors would presumably be more 
likely to receive stays than cases brought by direct competitors. 
  Courts have been reluctant to stay proceedings where parties are direct 
competitors lest money damages not compensate for loss of market share during the 
period of the stay. See, e.g., ADA Solutions, Inc. v. Engineered Plastics, Inc., 826 F. 
Supp. 2d 348, 351 (D. Mass. 2011) (explaining that when parties are direct 
competitors, courts presume that a stay will prejudice the nonmovant); Cooper 
Notification, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., No. 09-865-LPS, 2010 WL 5149351, at *5 (D. Del. 
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As a practical matter, district court decisions to grant stays 
are also likely to be influenced by recent Federal Circuit 
decisions indicating that the Federal Circuit may affirm PTO 
administrative cancellation of patent claims even in situations 
where it has previously affirmed district court decisions finding 
those same claims “not invalid” under the clear and convincing 
standard that applies in judicial proceedings.193 The Federal 
Circuit has also held that so long as the judicial proceeding has 
not concluded entirely, an administrative cancellation that it has 
affirmed eliminates any judicial cause of action on the part of the 
patentee.194  
All that said, there is reason to be cautious about predicting 
significant increases in district courts’ willingness to stay. The 
Federal Circuit cases discussed above do not specifically address 
the new IPR proceedings. Moreover, one year into the IPR 
procedures, there appears to have been no increase in grant rates 
with respect to contested motions. Of the sixty-two contested 
motions to stay pending concurrent litigation that have been 
filed, 59% have been granted.195 Overall, 71% of motions to stay 
have been granted.196 
Where a district court has stayed patent litigation, and 
the PTO has canceled the claims over which litigation is 
occurring, presumably the district court will dismiss the 
litigation.197 In contrast, when the PTO upholds claims, the 
                                                     
Dec. 13, 2010) (“Courts are reluctant to stay proceedings where the parties are direct 
competitors.”). 
 193. See, e.g., In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(discussing the distinction between a reexamination and a district court proceeding). The 
Baxter court emphasized not only the different burden of proof in administrative 
proceedings but also the PTO’s reliance in that case on prior art not raised in the trial 
court proceedings. Id. Prior Federal Circuit cases have similarly emphasized the 
importance of the different burdens of proof in administrative and judicial proceedings 
and have further noted that a district court proceeding merely finds a patent “not 
invalid.” See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d. 1368, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 194. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
In Fresenius, Judge Dyk, writing for the majority, concluded that Congress clearly 
intended for administrative cancellation of claims in ex parte examination proceedings to 
apply to concurrent judicial proceedings. Id. at 1339. This case was the judicial companion 
to the administrative decision upheld in In re Baxter. Id. at 1334. The district court had 
repeatedly denied motions to stay the litigation pending an administrative determination 
of the validity of the key Baxter patent. Id. at 1335. 
  A normative discussion of the very interesting administrative law issues raised 
by these Federal Circuit decisions is beyond the scope of this Article. I plan to address 
these questions in a subsequent paper. 
 195. See HARNESS DICKEY, supra note 177. As noted, in 81% of the IPR cases, the 
patent owner and patent challenger are involved in concurrent litigation. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332 (affirming the district court dismissal of the 
infringement case after the PTO cancelled the asserted claims of the patent). 
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interesting issue of how the district court should treat the 
PTO’s action arises.198 
In a 2007 article, I invoked the Supreme Court’s 
endorsement of administrative law principles in a 1999 patent 
case, Dickinson v. Zurko, involving direct Federal Circuit review 
of the PTO,199 to make the doctrinal argument that collateral 
district court review of PTO decision-making in the context of 
granted patents that are the subject of infringement or 
declaratory judgment suits should also be governed by 
administrative law principles.200 Since that time, however, the 
Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited 
Partnership on collateral judicial review of PTO patent grants 
has called into question whether the Court believes that 
administrative law principles apply to such review.201 In that 
case, the Court did not mention administrative law, even for 
purposes of briefly stating that default administrative law 
principles were superseded by specific statutory language. 
Instead the Court went straight to Section 282 of the patent 
statute, imbuing its language that a granted patent shall be 
“presumed valid” with great significance.202 According to the 
Court, the language of Section 282 codified earlier Supreme 
Court case law purportedly holding that an issued patent could 
be overturned only by “clear and convincing evidence.”203 The 
failure of the i4i decision even to mention administrative law 
suggests that analysts thinking about collateral judicial review of 
the new AIA procedures (as contrasted with direct review by the 
Federal Circuit, discussed below), may need to adopt a different 
framework. 
Presumably this framework would be highly deferential, 
however. Indeed, according to certain Federal Circuit cases, those 
who might wish to challenge in a judicial proceeding a patent 
                                                     
 198. See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[W]e see 
nothing untoward about the PTO upholding the validity of a reexamined patent which the 
district court later finds invalid [for that] is essentially what occurs when a court finds a 
patent invalid after the PTO has granted it.”). 
 199.  Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (“We must decide whether [the 
Administrative Procedure Act] applies when the Federal Circuit reviews •ndings of fact 
made by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).”). 
 200. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 280–84 (2007) (arguing 
that Section 282 of the Patent Act, which merely states that a patent “‘shall be presumed 
valid,’” should not be seen as supplanting the Administrative Procedure Act (quoting 35 
U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. II 2002))). 
 201.  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242, 2252–53 (2011) 
(holding that an invalidity defense must be proved by clear and convincing evidence). 
 202. Id. at 2242–43, 2245. 
 203. Id. at 2246. 
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that has been reaffirmed by the PTO bear a burden even higher 
than the “clear and convincing evidence” standard.204 
One approach to deference might involve the district court’s 
moving immediately to the issue of infringement. A problem that 
at least one district court judge has cited with this approach is 
that a claim construction made during a PTO proceeding may not 
be identical to that a judge would have made during a Markman 
hearing.205 Traditionally, the PTO has used a “broadest 
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification” 
approach to claim construction.206 Under this approach, even if an 
IPR upheld a claim under one claim construction, the district 
court may have to do its own claim construction for purposes of 
infringement analysis. In that circumstance, the amount of work 
saved by issuance of the stay pending administrative review 
would be reduced substantially. 
Indeed, proposed legislation introduced by Representative 
Robert Goodlatte in October 2013 has recognized this issue and 
has directed the PTO, in the case of IPR proceedings (as well as 
post-grant review proceedings) to use the same approach to claim 
construction that is used by courts.207 Even without such 
legislation, however, the PTO could proactively adopt a vision of 
the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) approach that does 
not pose an obstacle to realizing efficiencies. As Federal Circuit 
Judge Pauline Newman has recently noted, BRI is a matter of 
internal PTO examination protocol that can, and should, be 
clarified. Specifically, the PTO should clarify that the BRI 
approach is the starting point for the PTO’s inquiry into whether 
claims need to be amended.208 At the end of any review that it 
conducts, the PTAB should issue a claim construction that need 
                                                     
 204. See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 
961 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that the burden of proving invalidity is greater than clear 
and convincing evidence when the PTO has examined the patent post-grant); Interconnect 
Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 205. Marilyn L. Huff & Luiz Arroyo, A District Judge’s Perspective of Patent Case 
Management and the America Invents Act 5 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
 206.  In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 207. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 9 (2013). 
 208. For “additional views” of Judge Newman, see Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. 
Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, C.J., additional views) (“The 
‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ is an examination protocol, not a rule of law.”). In 
contrast with post-grant proceedings, claim constructions are rarely issued during initial 
examination. But the goal of public notice would probably be better served if BRI was not 
used even for claim constructions issued in an initial examination. See, e.g., Michael 
Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 192 
(2007) (arguing that BRI fails to eliminate many types of ambiguous claims). 
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not, and should not, be seen through the lens of BRI. Arguably, 
this view of BRI as a starting point for claim amendment would 
also be consistent with any Congressional legislation instructing 
the PTO to use district court claim construction methodology. 
How the Federal Circuit will review IPR proceedings is of 
course also extremely important. Because the role of the Federal 
Circuit is also central to the post-grant review discussion, 
however, I first introduce post-grant review. 
B. Post-Grant Review 
IPR is attractive because it can apply to existing patents.209 
But its scope is limited.210 In contrast, a post-grant review 
petition can challenge first-to-file patents on any ground.211 The 
PTO Director is authorized to institute a review proceeding if the 
information presented in the petition, and any rebuttal thereto, 
makes it “more likely than not” that at least one of the 
challenged claims in the petition will not be patentable.212 
Intriguingly, under Section 324(b) of the amended patent 
statute, the PTO Director is also allowed to grant a petition upon 
a showing that the petition “raises a novel or unsettled legal 
question that is important to other patents or patent 
applications.”213 The plain language indicates that Congress 
intends it as a vehicle for resolving general legal and policy 
questions.214 As for legislative history, the provision is identical to 
Section 327(b) of Senate Bill 3600, introduced in the 110th 
Congress.215 Senator Kyl, speaking in favor of Section 327(b) in 
2008, stated that it was “designed to allow parties . . . to resolve 
important legal questions early in the life of such 
controversies.”216 Although the PTO has stated that it intends to 
                                                     
 209. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012). 
 210. Id. § 311(b); see also Changes to Implement Post-Grant Review Proceedings, 77 
Fed. Reg. 7060, 7061 (Feb. 10, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (noting the limited 
grounds for IPR). 
 211. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b); see also Changes to Implement Post-Grant Review 
Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. at 7061. 
 212. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). 
 213. Id. § 324(b). 
 214. See id. 
 215. Compare id., with Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 327(b). 
 216. 154 CONG. REC. S9982, S9988 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Jon 
Kyl). The Senator goes on to say: 
Currently, for example, if there is debate over whether a particular subject 
matter or thing is really patentable, parties who disagree with PTO’s conclusion 
that it is patentable must wait until a patent is granted and an infringement 
dispute arises before the question can be tested in court . . . . [S]ubsection (b) 
creates an avenue by which the question can be conclusively resolved by the 
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use Section 324(b) “sparingly,”217 even sparing use may have 
substantial policy implications. 
Since post-grant review can only be brought within nine 
months of patent issuance,218 issues of interaction with concurrent 
trial court proceedings are not likely to be as important as in IPR.219 
Rather the key issue will be Federal Circuit review. How Federal 
Circuit review will work is of course also important for IPR 
proceedings. The next Subpart discusses why Chevron deference is 
probably applicable as a doctrinal matter. It also discusses whether 
such deference is normatively desirable. 
C. The Federal Circuit and Chevron Deference 
The AIA establishes detailed trial-type procedures for both 
post-grant and IPR proceedings.220 The statute is, however, silent 
on the standard by which courts should review these proceedings, 
at least on direct review. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has made 
it clear that, absent statutory language to the contrary, courts must 
apply Chevron deference in any direct review of legal 
determinations made by agencies in trial-type proceedings.221 
Consequently, as several commentators have now observed, 
doctrinal analysis would indicate that the Federal Circuit should 
give Chevron deference to any legal determinations made by the 
agency in these new proceedings.222 To put the point another way, 
the PTO will now be able to argue for the first time that its 
interpretations of the patent statute’s validity requirements are 
entitled to Chevron deference.223 
                                                     
Federal circuit before a large number of improper patents are granted and 
allowed to unjustifiably disrupt an industry. . . . [S]ubsection (b) allows PTO to 
reconsider an important legal question and to effectively certify it for Federal 
circuit resolution when it appears that the question is worthy of early conclusive 
resolution. 
Id. at S9988. 
 217. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review 
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 48,680, 48,629 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 218. 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). 
 219. Moreover, the AIA flatly provides that post-grant review petitioners may not 
previously have brought a civil action and that district courts may not stay requests for 
preliminary injunctions brought within three months of a granted patent on the grounds 
that post-grant review has been sought. Id. § 325(a)(1), (b). 
 220. See id. §§ 311–315, 321–324. 
 221. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 222. Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations 
for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1280 (2012); Melissa F. Wasserman, The 
Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1959, 1977–78, 1985–89 (2013). 
 223. Because the PTO does not have rulemaking authority for purposes of 
interpreting the validity requirements of the patent statute, and it has not thus far been 
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With Chevron deference, the PTO could exercise significant 
power over legal issues raised by specific patents.224 The PTO 
could also further develop the law of patent validity. Such 
development would be particularly apt in situations where a 
post-grant review petition was granted pursuant to the 
Section 324(b) provision allowing the PTO to adjudicate “novel or 
unsettled legal question[s] . . . important to other patents or 
patent applications.”225 
To be sure, as Melissa Wasserman has recently argued, 
because IPR and post-grant review proceedings involve patents 
that have already been granted, the PTO may be inclined to 
uphold these patents. Accordingly, it may invoke lax 
interpretations of various validity requirements and then seek 
Chevron deference for these lax interpretations.226 Although this 
is a legitimate concern, the PTO’s record on the old inter partes 
reexamination proceedings provides some reassurance. Of 398 
reexamination certifications in those proceedings, 11% confirmed 
all claims, 42% canceled all claims, and 40% made claim changes. 
Additionally, as I have discussed elsewhere, although the 
PTO is certainly susceptible to capture by “pro-patent” groups 
and may have certain financial incentives to grant patents,227 a 
variety of countervailing forces, ranging from pressure from 
other executive branch players to concerns about workload, 
operate to check pro-patent tendencies.228 In the case of software 
patent quality, White House interest in the subject has been 
quite acute.229 
A very different concern about Chevron deference involves 
the fear that the PTO, and the executive branch more generally, 
could use such deference to change patent law significantly, 
perhaps in ways that were influenced by political 
                                                     
authorized to conduct trial-type adjudications in making validity determinations, 
Supreme Court case law would indicate that Chevron has not, thus far, been applicable to 
PTO validity determinations. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229 (“We have recognized a very 
good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional 
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces 
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”). 
 224. Wasserman, supra note 222, at 2003–04 (stating that because many issues are 
more likely to appear before the PTO first, and not before a district court, the Federal 
Circuit would likely uphold the PTO’s decision under Chevron deference). 
 225. 35 U.S.C. § 324(b). 
 226. See Wasserman, supra note 222, at 1971 (“[E]very PTO validity determination 
could theoretically warrant strong judicial deference.”). 
 227. Id. at 2013–14 (arguing that, historically, the patent fee structure encouraged 
the PTO to issue patents because a significant amount of its patent operating budget 
would only be collected by granting patents). 
 228. Rai, supra note 125, at 336–38. 
 229. Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, supra note 17. 
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considerations.230 Indeed, given the Supreme Court’s decision in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X 
Internet Services, holding that administrative interpretations of 
statutes entitled to Chevron deference trump prior judicial 
determinations unless those prior judicial determinations held 
that the interpretation in question was the only permissible 
one,231 the PTO might even be able to reverse longstanding 
judicial precedent. This concern is likely to be particularly acute 
for those who view patents as property rights with respect to 
which “settled expectations” are paramount.232 
Commentators concerned about settled expectations may 
draw some comfort from two points, one doctrinal and one realist. 
First, because any ability by the PTO to claim Chevron deference 
on questions of substantive law is of very recent vintage, almost 
all patent case law developed through the judicial process was 
developed at a time when the PTO enjoyed no such claim.233 It is 
unclear whether the reasoning of Brand X applies to assertions of 
Chevron deference made in attempts to overturn judicial 
interpretations rendered prior to the time the agency enjoyed any 
such deference. Second, the empirical data indicate that, at least 
at the Supreme Court level, one very important factor in 
determining agency victory is whether the agency’s view is 
longstanding.234 Thus, to the extent that the Federal Circuit 
wants to curb very significant legal and policy shifts by the 
executive branch, it might be assisted in that endeavor by the 
Supreme Court. 
The biggest concern about PTO policymaking through 
adjudication of “novel or unsettled” questions is that, from a 
normative standpoint, notice-and-comment rulemaking is the 
preferred policymaking vehicle.235 Ideally, such rulemaking 
allows the agency to operate explicitly and transparently as an 
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expert policymaker, weighing the costs and benefits of a wide 
range of perspectives in a transparent manner.236 The problem is 
a real conundrum and may fuel the desire of the part of the PTO 
to use Section 324(b) “sparingly.” That said, to the extent that 
the costs and benefits associated with particular “unsettled” 
questions of patent law had been vetted thoroughly—such as 
through a request for comments of the sort that the PTO has 
sought on the application of Section 112(f)—policymaking 
through administrative adjudication might be a reasonable 
option. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Without a doubt, the institutional context within which the 
PTO operates is highly challenging. Even taking current 
institutional constraints as a given, however, the agency could, 
and should, do a substantial amount to improve patent quality. 
Drawing on patent and administrative law theory and doctrine, 
as well as new data from a software Art Unit with relatively 
strict examination practices, the Article has put forward a 
portfolio of pragmatic, cost-effective strategies. Strategies that 
revolve around Section 112 of the patent statute could usefully be 
deployed at the initial examination stage. Other strategies could 
be deployed within the new post-issuance procedures available to 
the agency under the America Invents Act. Notably, although the 
strategies the Article has discussed have the virtue of being 
neutral as to technology, they are likely to have a very significant 
practical impact in the area of software. 
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